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Through the dower, women gain access to property, yet at
the same time it is part of a legal system which defines
women as protected dependents. It can simultaneously be a
power resource for women and the expression of their gender
subordination. It underlines gender differences, yet it is also a
system which recognizes the importance of social 'sameness'
of men and women as marital partners.'
This Article evaluates the impact that eliminating or reducing the
marriage dower would have on the well-being of Muslim women in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Although Palestinian women's rights
organizations seek to eliminate dower on the grounds that it is a
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"burdensome custom" that is "inconsistent with the intifada's stated
goal of improving women's status,"2 in fact, the interaction between
dower and other laws relating to marriage and divorce is such that the
majority of women would be materially harmed by its discontinuance.
Therefore, while the movement to eliminate dower may benefit the
financially secure upper class women at its vanguard, it results in
financial insecurity and impoverishment for poor and particularly,
rural women. This Article, therefore, recommends that women's
movements in Palestine take greater heed of the class-differentiated
effects of dower, and protect the right of poor and rural women to
their only means of financial security.
Section I of the paper introduces the concept of dower and the
legal rules governing its use, and briefly discusses the forms and
amounts that dower takes in Palestinian marriage contracts. Section II
discusses the feminist movement to eliminate dower, and the
movement among educated Palestinian women to register a token
prompt dower in protest of the transactional flavor (money for sex) of
the traditional marriage paradigm. Section III then challenges the
feminist opposition to dower, first by arguing that the movement
reflects a nationalist rather than a feminist agenda, and second by
demonstrating that since dower is the only significant source of
income available to women outside of the maintenance-obedience
relationship of marriage, decreasing dower actually increases the
dependence of poor women on their husbands, rather than increasing
female autonomy. Finally, Section IV examines the interaction
between the laws of dower and other personal status laws in the
Palestinian Authority, and shows that eliminating or reducing the
dower reduces a wife's bargaining power within marriage and her
financial security outside of marriage.
1. INTRODUCTION TO DOWER IN PALESTINIAN FAMILY LAW
This section introduces the general Palestinian system of family
law, and discusses the particular laws that relate to the marriage dower.
Palestinian family law is not found in any Palestinian code of law; due
to Palestine's modern history of statelessness, the territories are
governed by the laws of the states that administered them during the
2. Adrien Katherine Wing, Custom, Religion and Rights: The Future Legal Status of Pales-
tinian Women, 35 HARv. INT'L L.J. 149, 188-89 (1994).
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period between 1948 and 1967.' Therefore, the West Bank is
governed according to Jordanian law, while Gaza is governed
according to Egyptian law, both of which adopted the Islamic system
of personal status law. Following the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian
Authority ("PA") asserted jurisdiction over lawmaking and the court
system, including the shari'a (religious) courts; however, continuing
instability has prevented the PA from promulgating its own personal
status code.' Palestinian personal status law is therefore still found in
the Jordanian and Egyptian codes. To avoid unnecessary duplication,
this Article cites to the Jordanian Personal Status Law of 1976
("JLPS"),5 and discusses Egyptian law only where it is in conflict with
Jordanian law.
Marriage under Muslim law is governed by the marriage contract,
which, like any commercial contract, is a binding offer and agreement
that gives rise to reciprocal rights and obligations. Article 35 of the
JLPS states that, "If the contract is valid then the wife is due mainte-
nance and dower from her husband, and mutual inheritance is
established., 6 The husband, in return, has a unilateral right to no-fault
divorce, and is entitled to obedience from his wife so long as he per-
forms his duty to pay her dower and maintenance
3. Emory University Law and Religion Program, Palestine/Palestinian Territories of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, Global Survey at http://els41.law.emory.edu/ifl/legal/
palestine.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2003).
4. While the Palestinian Qadi al-Quda has issued some personal status regulations that
are binding on the entire PA, these regulations are largely procedural. See id. The
draft Basic Law for the Palestinian Authority, which is seen by many as a good indi-
cator of the legal structure that the eventual Palestinian state will take (despite the fact
that Arafat never ratified the document), provides that "'the principles of the Islamic
shari'a are a principal source of legislation' (Art.4/2) and that 'matters of personal
status are to be dealt with by shari'a and religious courts' (Art.92/1)." Id.
5. The Jordanian Law on Personal Status is based largely on the Hanafi school of law,
and lacks many of the more moderate changes made to other Hanafi-based codes,
such as that of Egypt. See LYNN WELCHMAN, BEYOND THE CODE: MUSLIM FAMILY
LAW AND THE SHARfA JUDICIARY IN THE PALESTINIAN WEST BANK 10-15 (2000).
6. Id. at 196.
7. Obedience is a term of art in Islamic family law, and refers only to the fact that a wife
must obtain her husband's permission to leave the house. See id. at 198. Under Arti-
cles 37 and 47 of the Jordanian Law on Personal Status ("JLPS"), the wife is not
required to be obedient until the prompt dower has been paid-if the husband has
not paid in full all that he has agreed to in the marital contract, then he cannot force
his wife to remain in, or return to, the marital home. However, once prompt dower
has been paid, the wife may not refuse obedience on the grounds that deferred dower
has not yet been paid. Id. at 200.
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Dower, or mahr, is thus an essential part of marriage. In an ex-
change for her agreement to enter into an intimate relationship with
her husband and to offer him obedience, a wife is entitled to receive
from her husband a dower of money or goods (usually jewelry), which
is hers to keep for her own use.' Dower is owed whether or not it is
specified in the marital contract;9 if the contract does not specify an
agreed-upon sum, the husband still owes his wife "proper dower" even
if the marriage contract or other document contains a written agree-
ment by the wife to forego mahr.'°
One of the most important aspects of dower for the purposes of
this Article is the legally recognized distinction between "prompt" and
"deferred" dower. According to Article 45 of the JLPS, "The specified
dower may be paid promptly, or some or all of it may be deferred, pro-
vided that this is supported by written document."" Unless otherwise
specified, the dower agreed upon in the marriage contract is prompt,
and must be paid immediately on signing. 2 If deferred dower is speci-
fied, the law presumes it to be due "on the termination of the marriage
by death or divorce," unless some other legally permissible date is
stated in the marriage contract."
8. See id. at 139-57.
9. See id. at 137. Furthermore, the dower is generally considered "an inalienable effect
of the contract." The official marriage contract issued by the Palestinian Authority
includes a section in which the contracting parties may specify in detail how much
dowry is to be paid, when, and in what form. See id. at 135.
10. See id. at 139-40; JLPS, Article 44 (stating that the proper dower is the amount ap-
propriate to the social status of the wife and "her peers from among her paternal
relatives,"), quoted in WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 139-40.
11. Id. at 200.
12. See JLPS, Article 45 ("If the deferral is not explicitly stated, then the dower shall be
held to be prompt"), quoted in WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 200. Some authorities
contend that prompt dower only comes due at consummation of the marriage, rather
than at the signing of the marriage contract. Furthermore, since prompt dower is the
default assumption, if dowry is deferred in an illegal manner (such as dower that is
deferred "until wealth"), it is deemed to be prompt dower. See id. at 141.
13. See id. See also JLPS, Article 46, quoted in WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 200, which
places the following further restrictions on the use of deferred dower:
If the date of the deferred dower (falling due) is specified, then the wife
may not claim it before the set time has come, even if talaq occurs, while if
the husband dies, then the delay lapses. If the set time is absurd, such as
'till wealth' or 'until demand' (li-hayn al-talab) or 'until the wedding pro-
cession' (zifas) then the set time is irregular and the dower shall be prompt.
If the set time is not specified, the dower shall be considered deferred until
talaq or the death of one of the spouses.
[Vol. 10: 143
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Unfortunately, researchers have had great difficulty determining
how much dower Palestinian brides receive for several reasons. First,
few court cases involve disputes over the amount of proper dower
paid, so there are few records of the amount considered appropriate for
any particular woman's education level and social status. Second,
analysis of the specified dower is complicated by the prevalence of "se-
cret dowers," in which families announce a large dower to the public
and put that public dower in the marriage contract, but secretly agree
that the actual dower paid will be lower. 5 Thus, registered figures may
not accurately portray dower levels in Palestine. Nevertheless, dower
(excepting contracts that register a token dower) is widely considered
to be a significant sum; in 1985, those contracts in the West Bank that
did not register a token prompt dower' 6 were generally over 1,000 di-
17nars.
II. THE FEMINIST CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE DOWER
At first glance, it is difficult to understand why feminists would
object to a rule that results in a direct payment of wealth into the
hands of women. This section shows that the feminist movement to
eliminate mahr is associated with the desire of educated women to
have "modern" marriages. As will be shown, the movement began
among the upper class, secularized women of the West Bank, who
used the intifada as an escape route out of the traditional roles assigned
to them. These women, financially secure enough to do without mahr,
see the dower as a symbol of the traditional role their society expects
them to play. By eliminating dower, they hope to modernize gender
relations and free women from their subjugation to men. However,
Section III demonstrates that for women outside this narrow social
class, the opposite would in fact be true.
The Palestinian women's rights movement, which had existed for
decades as a persecuted minority movement, achieved true legitimacy
during the first intifada in the late 1980s and early 1990s. First, the
14. See id. at 140.
15. See id. at 203. This agreement is often recorded in a separate court document, in
order to prevent a bride's family from claiming a right to the publicly-recorded
dower. See JLPS, Article 59, quoted in WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 203.
16. See infra pp. 151-52 for a discussion of the evolution of the token prompt dower.
17. SeeWELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 153-54.
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pressing need for activists to fill the shoes of those captured or killed 8
led the secular leadership to woo female supporters and to portray the
intifada as a struggle for female liberation as well as national liberation,
and to offer women many tasks that traditionally were the province of
men: "Women collected donations, ran blood banks, passed out leaf-
lets, watched for soldiers, and looked after families of the arrested,
wounded, and dead. In this capacity, women themselves were arrested,
wounded, and killed."' 9 The political organizations of the resistance
invited female membership and encouraged female activism 20 and the
Draft Palestinian Basic Law declared all Palestinians to be equal under
the law "without discrimination on any grounds," including gender.2'
Second, the intifada's disruption of the traditional social struc-
ture22 provided Palestinian women with far more opportunities for
education and participation in public life than they had ever had be-
fore. 23 Women voted in large numbers in 1996, and twenty-eight
18. See Wing, supra note 2, at 187 ("It was clearly out of necessity that Palestinian
women took on responsibilities and issues that pre-intifada Palestinian culture did
not include in the definition of the female gender role.").
19. Id. at 186.
20. See id. at 186-87. "Women became the core of the movement to develop Palestinian
self-sufficiency and boycott Israeli goods." Id. at 186.
21. Women Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling, A Gap Analysis Report on the Status of the
Palestinian Women in the Context of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (Sept. 2000), at http://www.wclac.org/
cedawengeditedfinal.htm [hereinafter WCLAC Report].
22. Suzanne Ruggi, Commodifing Honor in Female Sexuality: Honor Killings in Palestine, 28
MIDDLE EAST REPORT (1998) (citing Lisa Taraki of the Birzeit University's Women's
Studies Program, who "tentatively suggests that the patriarchal nature of Palestinian so-
ciety could be undergoing a redefinition due to socioeconomic changes, such as the
growth of employment prospects for women, the rising age of marriage, rising educa-
tional levels for women and the break up of the extended family."), at
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer206/ruggi.htm.
23. According to Adrien Katherine Wing:
One way in which custom has been influenced by the intifada is illustrated
by the increased participation in the legal system by women and other non-
traditional actors. Pre-intifada participants in the Palestinian legal system
were traditionally highly respected men of senior stature who served as reli-
gious or customary law mediators, qadis, and lawyers (muhamein). Today, in
addition to women, the Underground Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU),
popular justice committees, and private individuals mediate issues such as
spousal quarrels and regulate mahr reductions. The legitimacy of these new
actors results from the roles they played during the intifada, rather than
through customary or religious status.
Wing, supra note 2, at 185.
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women were elected to the PLC;24 although women still hold only a
small percentage of top decision-making posts and have yet to break
into parochial government,25 female representation in Palestine is far
better than in Egypt or Jordan.2 School enrollment is comparable for
males and females at the primary and secondary levels, and women
comprised 42-45% of students in Palestinian universities in 1996-
97.27 While only 77% of women overall are literate,2s over 98% of
women in the fifteen to twenty-four year age range are literate.29 These
higher levels of education may also be attributed to women marrying
later affording them greater employment opportunities prior to mar-
riage."
24. Of the registered voters, 49% were female, although only 32% of actual voters were
women: "The discrepancy indicated to many observers the existence of restrictions and
impediments that prevented many women from exercising their voting right." WCLAC
Report, supra note 21. Five women were elected to the PLC, taking 6% of the eighty-
nine total seats, while women now constitute 12% of the Palestinian National Council
membership. See id. However, women are not represented at all in the PLO's Executive
Committee. See id.
25. According to the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, "women represent 13% of the staff in
administrative positions, they hold only 3% of top decision-making positions, such as
legislators and upper level public servants." See WCLAC Report, supra note 21. "In
other public posts, such as village or town councils or project committees for rural
communities, the number of women appointed to positions is nominal. Out of a total
of 3,081 such positions, only 13 are held by women." Id, There are also currently only
three Palestinian judges, none of whom, of course, sit on shari'a courts. See id
26. No women currently sit on Jordan's legislature, while Egypt has a smaller percentage of
women in its legislature than the PA. See International Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance, In Search ofPolitical Power-Women in Parliament in Egypt, Jordan
and Lebanon, at http://www.idea.int/women/parl/studiesla.htm (last visited Mar. 12,
2003).
27. By 1997, girls made up 49.11% of the primary and secondary student populations. See
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics [hereinafter PCBS], SELECTED STATISTICS: EDU-
CATION INDICATORS, at http://www.pcbs.org/inside/selcts.htm (last visited Apr. 5,
2003). In 1996-97, women made up 45.1% of the student population at West Bank
universities, and 42.5% of the student population in Gaza universities. In addition, fe-
male students outnumber males in training institutes and colleges by a slim margin of
51% to 49%. WCLAC Report, supra note 21.
28. See WCLAC Report, supra note 21.
29. PCBS, SELECTED STATISrICS: EDUCATION INDICATORS, supra note 27 (showing that in
1997, 2.2% of girls in the West Bank and 2.4% of girls in Gaza in the fifteen to nine-
teen year range were illiterate; compared to 3.3% of West Bank women and 3.7% of
Gazan women who were illiterate in the twenty to twenty-four age range).
30. PCBS, SELECTED STATISTICS: ECONOMIC AcTIvTry, 1997, at http://www.pcbs.org/
inside/selcts.htm (showing that in 1995, none of the mean ages for first marriage for
girls was below twenty, and only between 3% and 12% of girls between the ages of fif-
teen and nineteen had ever been married) (last visited Apr. 5, 2003).
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As a result of their increasing equality with men in the public
sphere, middle and upper class women began to resent their
continuing subjugation to men in the private sphere, and began to
agitate for reforms to the personal status law, which had remained
virtually untouched since 1967. One significant campaign has been
to eliminate the dower, or mahr.32
To the "modern" women of Palestine in the second half of the
twentieth century, dower is the lynchpin in a decidedly un-modern
marital relationship: the wife "sells" sexual rights to the husband for the
dower price, and agrees to submit to his will with regards to her own
public life in exchange for regular maintenance. Moors relates the reac-
tion of a girl in the 1970s who, when asked by her brother whether she
wished to have a dowry, replied indignantly, "Am I a donkey that he has
to pay for me?"33
Even before women began to lobby for formal limits on the
dower,34 the feminist opposition to dower led to private inroads against
payment of large cash dowers. First, there has been a "sharp reversal of
the older pattern of having the registered value of the cash prompt
dower greater than the value of the deferred dower."35 Whereas in 1965
the prompt dower was larger than the deferred dower in 85% of all
contracts sampled, by 1985 the deferred dower was greater than the
31. According to Adrien Katherine Wing:
It was clearly out of necessity that Palestinian women took on responsibilities
and issues that pre-intifada Palestinian culture did not include in the defini-
tion of the female gender role. It is doubtful that such social and political
mobilization of Palestinian women would have occurred if the women felt
that their particular needs and concerns were being adequately addressed by
the intifada leadership. This redefinition of their own roles in the community
must necessarily lead these women to question and evaluate the "traditional"
role occupied by Palestinian women. As their new roles project a more egali-
tarian position for the Palestinian woman, it is likely that these women will
perceive their "traditional" roles as too limiting.
Wing, supra note 2, at 188.
32. Id. at 187.
33. See MooRs, supra note 1, at 108.
34. It should be noted that it is questionable whether dower may be formally abolished or
even limited under a Muslim system of family law. Of all countries with Muslim per-
sonal status codes, only South Yemen has ever set an upper limit on the amount of
dower, and this limitation was removed when the Republic of Yemen unified the per-
sonal status laws of its two jurisdictions. Limitations on dower are thus "not generally
regarded as a matter for regulation by law ... and classical position that held a maxi-
mum could not be imposed in law has been little challenged." WELCHMAN, supra note
5, at 153.
35. See id. at 142.
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prompt dower in 70% of all contracts reviewed.36 This preference of
deferred dower over prompt dower is positively correlated with the
female education level, which Welchman attributes to the negative
effect of education on women's attitudes toward the material,
transactional nature of a traditional marriage. 7 The preference for
deferred over prompt dower thus arises out of a desire to change the
nature of the marital relationship.R
This desire for a modern marriage between autonomous equals is
also reflected in the prevalence of the "token prompt dower."39 Gener-
ally registered in the West Bank and Gaza as one dinar, the token
prompt dower began in the 1960s among the highly educated profes-
sionals of Nablus as "an expression of modernity., 4' According to
Moors, in the context of Palestinian marriages, an "important feature of
the token dower is its symbolic meaning regarding a woman's auton-
omy, which can be seen as an important sign of modernity."4 Upper
class women, educated at Westernized universities, prefer to receive
non-monetary gifts that support the modern view of marriage as a ro-
mantic union between two equals.42
An example of such a "modern marriage" is that of 'Abir and Nafiz,
as told by Annelies Moors.43 Both university educated political activists,
'Abir and Nafiz waited six years to marry, until 'Abir had finished her
degree, and 'Abir accepted Nafiz's proposal on the condition that she be
allowed to dress as she pleased and pursue further academic studies or a
career if she so chose. She also refused to accept anything more than a
token prompt dower, and refused Nafiz's offer of a large deferred
dower.44 However, while the token dower was registered in the marriage
contract, her stipulations regarding work and dress were not; 'Abir's de-
cision stripped her of virtually all of her legal rights to financial security
without providing any legal guarantees for her much-treasured
36. See id. This trend extends across the region-for example, one researcher found that in
the Jordanian village Kufr al-Ma', the registration of deferred dower was very rare in
1960, but by 1979 deferred dower was of equal or greater value than the prompt dower
in nearly all contracts registered. See id.
37. See id. at 143.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 145. See generally MooRs, supra note 1, at 108-10.
41. Laila al-Zwaini, International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World
Workshop Report, 2000, at http://isim.leidenuniv.nl/newsletter/6/isim/3.html.
42. See id. at 108.
43. Seeid. at 110-11.
44. See id.
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autonomy." Thus, the emancipation of this modern Palestinian woman
depends largely on the honor of her husband.
From this "modernizing elite," the token dower spread down
through the social classes and into the villages and camps." In 1994, the
Palestinian NGO, Women's Center for Legal Aid and Counseling
[hereinafter WCLAC], found that 53% of contracts reviewed in Ramal-
lah registered a token dower, and one third of contracts in Nablus
registered a token dower.47 The use of token dowers is much lower in
Gaza: only 4% of marriage contracts in Gaza City and 8% of marriage
contracts in Rafah registered token prompt dowers.48 Although Moors
suggests that the bride's family will expect more nonmonetary gifts if
they register token prompt dowers, she gives examples of cases in which
this expectation is not fulfilled, to the financial detriment of the bride
and her family. 9 For this reason, Moors concludes that "registering a
token dower means taking a risk."5° Section III demonstrates that while
this situation may be acceptable to someone of 'Abir's socioeconomic
status, it is a risk that the poor and rural women of Palestine can ill af-
ford to take.
III. THE TRUTH ABOUT DOWER IN PALESTINIAN SOCIETY
Section II explained that the feminist movement to eliminate
dower in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is an upper class movement,
and proceeds from the assumption that elimination of mahr will in-
crease a woman's autonomy. This section disputes that assumption.
First, it challenges the basis of women's objections to dower, by demon-
strating that the legitimacy of the women's movement in general
depends on its association with the nationalist movement, and that in
this case the nationalist movement likely made mahr a "women's issue"
in order to advance its own concerns. Second, this section demonstrates
45. See id.
46. See id. at 106-08 (discussing the social forces behind the rising use of token prompt
dowers).
47. See WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 145.
48. See id.
49. See MooRs, supra note 1, at 108-09 (discussing the case of a family that registered a
token dower in expectation that the groom's family would provide expensive gifts of
jewelry as well as all household goods, bedroom furniture, and the bride's clothing;
instead, the bride received only the bedroom furniture and a negligible amount of
jewelry, forcing the bride's family to provide the rest of her dowry.).
50. Id. at 113.
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that far from increasing autonomy, eliminating mahr increases the de-
pendence of most women on their husbands, since they have few
resources other than dower and maintenance on which to survive.
A. Questioning the Origins of the Movement to Eliminate Mahr
This section examines the relationship between feminism and na-
tionalism in occupied Palestine, and concludes that the movement to
eliminate mahr was probably grafted onto the feminist movement by
external forces that saw reduced dowry to be in the overall national in-
terest, not necessarily the interests of Palestinian women.
As Section II demonstrated, the Palestinian nationalist movement
embraced feminist issues and couched much of its rhetoric in pro-
feminist language in order to rally women to the nationalist cause. By
the same token, feminist groups, which traditionally encounter a great
deal of opposition in Muslim societies, legitimized their own agenda by
aligning it with the nationalist agenda, as can be seen by their argument
that mahr is "inconsistent with the intifada's stated goal of improving
women's status." 51 However, it becomes unclear who is using whom
when the same women argue for elimination of mahr based on the needs
of men under the intifada. Adrien Katherine Wing reports of these
groups:
They also point out that the revolutionary nature of the inti-
fada and the resultant oppression by the Israelis make it
extremely difficult for many Palestinian men to maintain sta-
ble employment. Thus, many men are unable to pay the large
sums of money required by mahr. In response to the encour-
agement of women's groups, some individual women and
couples have lowered the amount paid or even rejected the
practice entirely. One Gazan lawyer and his wife agreed that he
would only pay U.S. $5,000 instead of the $10,000 that
would have been required for someone of her high educational
status before the intifada 2
Thus, while the nationalist cause offered feminists a public forum they
might not otherwise have had, it also hindered the women's movement
51. Wing, supra note 2, at 188-89.
52. Id. at 189.
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by "emptying it of its feminist and class content and limiting it to the
confines of the national liberation struggle.""
In the case of dower, it seems probable that the nationalist cause as-
signed to the feminist movement an issue that was in the interests not of
women, but of the Palestinian nationalist cause itself. The case of the
"modern marriage" of 'Abir and Nafiz described in the previous section
is instructive on this issue. Regarding her decision to register a token
prompt dower and refuse a high deferred dower, 'Abir said: "The high
dower pushes the most politically conscious men to leave the country to
marry a woman who does not demand a dower."54 Thus, most public
discussion of dower surrounds the burden it imposes on young men and
their families, particularly in difficult economic times, and the media
lectures society, "particularly the families of the brides," to adjust their
expectations regarding dower." In addition to the nationalist left, the
religious right also objects to high dowers as an impediment to young
men's marriages. For example, the qadi of Ramallah published several
newspaper articles in which he chastised Palestinian society for demand-
ing high dower, since this expectation encourages young men to delay
marriage or even to marry foreign women, who place little importance
on dower. A later article lamented the demand for excessive dower as it
represented a movement of Palestinian society away from the path of
the Prophet.56 Strikingly absent from both the nationalist and the reli-
gious arguments is a consideration of how mahr affects women, other
than the implication that women who demand high dowers are greedy.
It is certainly possible that the feminist argument against mahr and
the nationalist/religious arguments against mahr developed
simultaneously but separately, and that women genuinely consider
elimination of mahr to be in their interests as women as well as in the
interests of their people as a whole. Nonetheless, feminist movements to
eliminate mahr have often occurred in the context of economic hardship
or nationalist struggle. In Egypt, the movement to decrease mahr in the
1930s coincided with a significant economic depression.57 In Algeria,
feminists began to agitate against dower as an "antiquated custom that
objectifies women" at the same time that the nationalists FLN, fighting
53. Rita Giacaman & Muna Odeh, Palestinian Women's Movement in the Israeli-Occupied
West Bank and Gaza Strip, in WOMEN OF THE ARAB WORLD: THE COMING CHAL-
LENGE 62 (Nahib Toubia ed. & trans., 1988), quoted in Wing, supra note 2, at 184.
54. MooRs, supra note 1, at 111.
55. WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 153.
56. See id. at 154-55.
57. Id. at 155.
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for independence from France, sought to limit the maximum mahr."
This association suggests that the feminist objection to dower is
intimately connected to national needs, rather than being a product of
an independent evaluation of what would be best for women. Lazreg
further notes that despite this opposition to dower on both fronts, its
average value continued to rise, showing that brides and their families
still clearly considered a high dower to be in their interests.59
B. Dower as the Primary Source of Independent
Wealth for Palestinian Women
The realities of life in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are such that
the dower is the only independent source of wealth to which most Pales-
tinian women have access. Inheritance laws favor male heirs, and legal
and social norms minimize female labor force participation. 60 Further-
more, the transition of Palestinian society (and Palestinian women in
particular) from productive to consumptive wealth means that the size
of the dower is crucial since its ability to support its owner is finite.
Thus, dower remains "a potentially critical element in the balance of
rights and duties between the spouses.",61
Under Palestinian law, inheritance portions adhere to the tradi-
tional Hanafi rules, in which women generally inherit half the portion
of their male counterparts: daughters half as much as sons; wives half as
much as husbands; sisters half as much as brothers.6' This greatly limits
the resources available to women outside of the marital relationship, since
they cannot count on disbursements from the estates of relatives. Addi-
tionally, social norms stigmatize female labor force participation, further
increasing a woman's dependence on male wage earners. Despite the na-
tionalist movement's encouragement of female participation in public life,
the struggle against Israel has created a religious and cultural backlash to
all things "non-Palestinian," which caused a tremendous opposition to
changes within the structure of the family, the foundation of Palestinian
society.63 One of the changes most strenuously opposed is a change in the
58. See WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 155 (quoting MARNtA LAzREY, THE ELOQUENCE OF
SILENCE: ALGERIAN WOMEN IN QUESTION (1994)).
59. See id.
60. See id. at 156.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 212.
63. See Wing, supra note 2, at 190-91, 193 (discussing attacks on secular women by
Hamas activists); see also id. at 197 ("while social change has taken place in the nature
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traditional, home-bound role of women.64 Husbands enforce their legal
right to forbid their wives from working, and social stigma makes life very
uncomfortable for unmarried women who are forced by economic neces-
sity to work.65 The result is a very low rate of labor force participation:
only 11.6% of the 1999 Palestinian work force were women." Female
employment is concentrated in those sectors that receive the lowest
67wages, such as agriculture, services, and the public sectors.
In addition, several larger socio-economic changes have increased the
importance of dower in women's lives. First, the nuclear family has taken
precedence over the extended family as the central social unit, with the
result that married women are increasingly isolated from their blood
relations. Whereas social norms during British colonial rule following
World War I permitted women to return to their fathers' homes in times
of marital difficulty, today most married women are not welcome in their
childhood homes. 68 This isolation increases their dependence on their
husbands. Second, the economic structure is changing from one of
family-based production to wage labor, which takes economic production
out of the home and thus out of the realm of women. The emphasis on
wage labor has also decreased possession of productive assets such as land
and livestock, making it less likely that women will receive productive
property as gifts, dower or inheritance. 69 Finally, the increasing emphasis
on wage labor devalues the work that women do in rural areas and the
of customary and religious norms in the women's rights arena during the intifada,
there has been retrenchment due to fundamentalist pressures as well.").
64. Id. at 196.
65. See WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 224-25.
66. See WCLAC Report, supra note 21. While Palestinian women accounted for 35% of
total domestic job growth in 1999, 84.2% of women in West Bank and 93.1% in
Gaza Strip do not form a part of the official, paid workforce. See also PROGRAMME ON
GOVERNANCE IN THE ARAB REGION, PALESTINE: WOMEN IN PUBLIC LIFE, at
http://www.pogar.org/countries/palestine/women.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2002).
This percentage reflects significant differences between the West Bank and Gaza. In
many cities in the West Bank, which is the home to a greater proportion of secular
nationalist groups, female labor force participation reaches as high as 22%, while in
Gaza, which is under the control of the religious right, female labor force participa-
tion is below 10%. See PCBS, SELECTED STATISTICS: ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 1997, at
http://www.pcbs.org/inside/selcts.htm. Women as a percentage of the labor force in
1997: Jenin, 22%; Tulkarm & Qalqilya, 17.3%; Nablus, 20.1%; Ramallah & al-
Bireh, 13.4%; Jerusalem, 12.3%; Bethlehem & Jericho, 18.7%; Hebron, 12.5%;
North Gaza, 7.2%; Gaza City, 7.3%; Central Gaza, 10%; South Gaza, 11%. See id.
67. PROGRAMME ON GOVERNANCE IN THE ARAB REGION, supra note 66.
68. CHERYL A. RUBENBERG, PALESTINIAN WOMEN: PATRIARCH AND RESISTANCE IN THE
WEST BANK 103-04 (2001).
69. See MOORS, supra note 1, at 125 (discussing the impact that these socioeconomic
changes have had on women's access to property through the dower).
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informal sector. Instead of viewing women's work as a productive and
adding value to the economy, a woman's role is seen as that of a
consumer, and as such women are entirely dependent on their husbands
for maintenance. 70 Therefore, in contrast to the situation in the early
part of the twentieth century, Palestinian women today have fewer
means of receiving or producing cash other than through their
husbands.7 Divorced women must return to their fathers' home until
they remarry; poor women whose families cannot support them and
who do not have the training to obtain a decent job must take a job in a
factory, where they face the scorn of society as both divorced women
and factory workers."
In this socio-economic context, women would be most benefited
by a reform that maximizes not their legal autonomy, but their eco-
nomic power. As Section IV demonstrates, eliminating dower has
precisely the opposite effect.
IV. IMPACT OF DOWER ON WOMEN VIS-X-VIS
OTHER PERSONAL STATUS LAWS
This section analyzes the interaction between dower and other
family law rules such as those governing marriage formation, polygamy,
and divorce. It demonstrates that given the socio-economic context,
eliminating mahr would decrease women's abilities to guarantee a favor-
able situation within marriage, reduce their ability to exit an undesirable
marriage, and deplete their economic resources considerably should
their marriage dissolve.
A. Mahr and Marriage
1. Opportunities for Bargaining in the Marriage Contract
This section demonstrates that eliminating dower reduces a bride's
ability to bargain for desirable stipulations in her marriage contract.
Article 19 of the JLPS states that a marriage contract may include any
stipulation "that is of benefit to one of the parties," so long as it "is not
inconsistent with the intentions of marriage," and "does not impose
70. Id.
71. See WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 156.
72. RUBENBERG, supra note 68.
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something unlawful. 7 3 The statute specifically lists stipulations that the
husband not remove his wife from her town, that he not marry another
wife, and that he delegate to her the power to divorce, as examples of
valid stipulations.4 The marriage contract issued by the PA includes a
blank section in which these stipulations may be written.75 Stipulations
are "binding but not enforceable," a stipulation against polygamy in a
marriage contract cannot be enforced to prevent polygamy, and does not
nullify any subsequent marriages entered into by the husband.7 6 Instead,
it provides the wife with a judicially enforceable remedy in case of
violation, by stating that the husband must pay his first wife money, or
grant her a divorce if she requests it, upon his marriage to a second
wife.77
Dower is one of the fundamental bargaining tools in a traditional
marriage negotiation-a groom's family might offer more dower in
exchange for the bride agreeing to accompany her husband abroad when
he works, or the bride's family might agree to accept less dower in
exchange for a promise regarding the type of house that will be
provided. This type of informal bargaining could be applied to the
formal marriage negotiations as well-for example, a woman could
agree to a reduction in dower in exchange for stipulations in their
marriage contract guaranteeing her right to work and to divorce,
preventing polygamy, or requiring that they live near their mothers.
However, such bargaining is impeded by the strong social stigma
among Palestinians against the use of stipulations, which are generally
considered to be an affront to the husband's honor and a breach of
spousal trust; most families prefer instead to extract the oral assurances
described above.78 This preference is reflected in the extremely low use
of stipulations in Palestinian marriage contracts: of 3,319 marriage
contracts examined in Bethlehem, Ramallah, and Hebron in 1985, only
twenty-one, or 0.2%, contained stipulations. 9 Research by the WCLAC
covering the years 1989, 1992, 1993, and 1994 found that 2% of
73. JLPS, Article 19, quoted in WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 160. Examples of an unlaw-
ful stipulation include "if one of the spouses stipulates that the other shall not live
with him/her, or that they shall not share marital intimacy, or that one of them shall
drink alcohol, or shall break off relations with their parents." Id. If such a stipulation
is recorded, it is automatically void and the marriage contract remains valid. Id.
74. Id.
75. See WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 135.
76. Id. at 162.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 164-65.
79. See id. at 164.
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marriage contracts in Nablus contained stipulations, but that in
Ramallah stipulations were included in only two out of 4,643
80
contracts.
Despite the social pressures against the use of written stipulations,
however, the financial carrot of reduced dower might be significant
enough to assuage the slight against a groom's honor. For example,
many stipulations against polygamy require the husband to increase the
dower if he takes on another wife.8 After agreeing on a reasonable
prompt dower, a bride's family might offer to halve the amount in ex-
change for a stipulation against polygamy, and require the groom to pay
the entire amount only if he marries another wife. Elimination of the
dower, however, would deny women and their families the opportunity
to make such a deal.
2. Mahr as a Source of Power Within Marriage
The second way in which dower can protect a wife's rights within
marriage is by giving her economic power within the marital relation-
ship. Article 47 of the JLPS states that the wife has a right to withhold
obedience until the prompt dower is paid.82 Laxity concerning the pay-
ment of this, often large, sum can be a source of bargaining power even
after the marriage contract is signed, since a wife can make a credible
threat that she will sue for full payment if her wish is not granted.83 By
contrast, if a wife agrees to a token dower, any nonmonetary gifts that
she might rightfully expect cannot be legally demanded, and the wife
cannot use this expectation "to strengthen her position in the relation-
ship."84
In Palestinian society, the size of dower increases a wife's power in
the relationship by giving her resources from which to support the fam-
ily. Although the law reserves dower to the wife's personal use and does
not require her to contribute it in any way to the household or to her
own maintenance,"' Palestinian women frequently use their dower as
emergency reserves to help their families through economically difficult
80. See id. In the WCLAC survey in Nablus in the 1990s, out of the total of 133 stipula-
tions, seventy were on an independent dwelling, twenty on continuing education,
and nine on the geographical location of the marital home. Id. at 166.
81. See WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 204.
82. See JLPS, Article 47, quoted in WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 200.
83. SeeMooRs, supra note 1, at 116.
84. WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 146.
85. Id. at 212.
20031
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
times. Research of polygamous relationships shows that working wives
often enjoy greater autonomy because of the income that they contrib-
ute to the household,86 and this is likely to be true for women who
contribute their dower wealth as well. If dower were eliminated, this
resource would remain in their husbands' hands, and wives would lose
control over how and when (and on whom) it should be spent.
3. Mahr and Polygamy
Elimination of mahr, by decreasing the overall cost of each mar-
riage, may also harm women by increasing the incidence of polygamy in
Palestinian society. It is well settled that polygamous marriages cause
subjective and often objective harm to women in comparison with mo-
nogamous marriages. 87 Whether or not eliminating mahr would actually
harm women by increasing polygamy, however, is far from clear. First,
some researchers argue that housing costs far outweigh dower levels as
the primary cost of marriage. Second, it may be that polygamy does not
result in absolute harm to women if it replaces divorce. This section
analyzes the issue, and concludes that the interaction between elimina-
tion of dower and the laws of polygamy does not produce a clearly
negative effect on the lives of women.
A man's right to enter into polygamous marriage in the West Bank
and Gaza carries with it only a few restrictions: a man may marry up to
four wives,89 is required to "be just and equitable between them," and
"may not settle them in one house without their consent. ' While wives
may go to court to force their husband to provide separate lodgings, the
requirement of just and equitable treatment is considered to be non-
justiciable."
Studies of polygamy in the PA show that it negatively affects the
material and emotional well-being of preexisting wives. Since subse-
quent marriages are more likely to be based on affection rather than
family arrangements, "second and subsequent wives often experience
86. Alean AI-Krenawi et al., The Psychosocial Impact of Polygamous Marriages on Palestin-
ian Women, 34:1 WOMEN & HATH 1, 10-11 (2001).
87. Id. at 3.
88. WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 185 ("The legislation currently in force in the West
Bank reflects none of the developments in neighboring countries.").
89. JLPS, Article 28, quoted in WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 186.
90. JLPS, Article 40, quoted in WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 5.
91. WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 197 ("None of the cases studied however raised the issue
of what constitutes unequal treatment.").
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favored status with respect to economic resources, social support, and
attention." 92 In a study of polygamous marriages in Gaza refugee camps,
second and third wives were found to be younger and better educated
than senior wives; 40% of junior wives worked outside the home but
none of the senior wives did, giving junior wives greater economic
power in the household." Thus, from the perspective of Palestinian
women, the transition from a monogamous to a polygamous household
is something to be avoided.
Rational choice theory dictates that the expenses associated with
taking another wife will affect the incidence of polygamy;94 thus, the
higher the dower that a husband must raise in order to marry another
wife, the lower the incidence of polygamy. This theory is consistent with
Moors' observation that divorce is deterred by the prospect of having to
raise a new prompt dower-presumably, this requirement would deter
polygamous marriage as well-and is further supported by the relatively
low incidence of polygamy in the West Bank and Gaza.95 In the 1990s,
WCLAC found the rate of polygamy recorded in marriage contracts to
be 4.5% for the West Bank, and 3.8% for Ramallah. In 1998, the
PBCS reported that the rate of polygamy in Gaza was 4.4% and in the
West Bank was 3%, "giving an overall rate of 3.5%. ,,96
However, this theory is contradicted by the fact that during the
same period that deferred dowers became more important than prompt
dowers and marriages in every class began to register token prompt
dowers, the rate of polygamy also began to decrease. This fact points to
the conclusion, reached by many researchers, that dower is less impor-
97tant than the cost of housing as a deterrent to polygamous unions.
Custom is moving more and more toward wives requiring dwellings
separate from the family home or the homes of other wives, as opposed
to merely having their own separate suite of rooms in a common build-
ing.9' Moors states that the greatest financial burden of marriage is not
dower, but housing;99 and while this is unlikely to prevent a man from
marrying at all (though it may well increase the age of marriage), it is
logical to assume that the added burden of maintaining two or more
92. Alean AI-Krenawi et al., supra note 86, at 3.
93. See generally id.
94. JOYCE P. JACOBSEN, THE ECONOMICS OF GENDER 95-96 (1994) (explaining rational
choice theory).
95. WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 190.
96. See id.
97. See, e.g., MOORS, supra note 1, at 119-21; see also RUBENBERG, supra note 68, at 108.
98. See WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 176.
99. See MooRs, supra note 1, at 119-21.
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residences would be a significant deterrent to polygamy.' °° Whether or
not mahr is eliminated, the price of housing is likely to remain a major
determinant of polygamy rates in the West Bank and Gaza."'
A far more serious consideration is whether decreasing polygamy is
in the interests of Palestinian women in the first place. It is suggested
that "in a society where women are not allowed to live on their own and
divorce is so easy for men, the continued existence of polygamy might be
a reasonable option for older women, who at least do not lose their
homes, social status, and economic support. ' 2 According to Welchman,
stipulations in Palestinian marriage contracts against the husband taking
another wife are more commonly remedied by the requirement that he
pay her a sum of money, rather than giving her the right to divorce. °3
This indicates that given the fact of polygamy, women are more inter-
ested in shoring up their financial position within a polygamous
marriage rather than taking their chances outside of it.
Thus, it is unclear whether the interaction between the elimination
of'mahr and the rules of polygamy would result in harm to women.
However, the outcome of this interaction certainly does not benefit
women, and therefore the interaction of the dower rules with the mar-
riage and divorce rules described in the rest of this section remains
paramount.
100. See RUBENBERG, supra note 68, at 108 (stating that the rate of polygamy in the PA
has declined over time due to economic factors: "Given the extent of poverty and un-
employment in West Bank camps and villages, a second wife and additional children
is a luxury few men can afford ... fewer still have the resources to construct separate
living quarters for each family.").
101. Having said this, it must be noted that polygamy rates are higher in the refugee
camps and the surrounding villages, where many have abandoned mahr due to
financial constraints. See RUBENBERG, supra note 68, at 108 (stating that while the
Central Palestinian Bureau of Statistics records an overall average of 3.5% of
marriages being polygamous, another researcher found the rate of polygamy to be 5-
10% in the villages); see also Wing, supra note 2, at 189 ("Even before the intifada,
mahr had been nearly abandoned in communities located near refugee camps where
families lacked wealth and where employment opportunities existed for both sexes.").
It is likely, however, that this larger percentage increase is not associated with the lack
of dower but rather with the fact the second wives tend to be employed and therefore
constitute economic assets to the household rather than economic liabilities. See
Mean AI-Krenawi et al., supra note 86, at 11.
102. RUBENBERG, supra note 68, at 110 (quoting NiRA YUVAL-DAviS, GENDER AND NA-
TION 118 (1997)).
103. See WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 168.
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B. Mahr and Divorce
1. Mahr and Talaq
This section evaluates the interaction between mahr and talaq, the
husband's right to unilateral no-fault divorce, in order to determine the
effect that eliminating mahr would have on the well-being of married
and divorced women. This section demonstrates that while eliminating
mahr would probably not increase the incidence of talaq, it would sub-
stantially reduce the economic resources available to divorced women.
Under Palestinian law, there are very few restrictions on a hus-
band's right of unilateral divorce. The husband must pronounce ta/aq
on three separate occasions, and must do so in a sound state of mind.04
The wife need not be present, but must be informed within one week of
talaq.1°5 While most talaqs are pronounced in court, extra-judicial talaq
is permissible so long as the husband registers it within fifteen days. 
6
With so few legal restrictions, women's rights organizations seek
extra-legal means of reigning in the use of talaq; much of the literature
on this issue promotes a high deferred dower (as well as the prompt
dower that would be demanded when the man remarried) as a deterrent
against talaq.107 The logic appears sound: if a husband chooses to
unilaterally divorce his wife, he must pay her all of her deferred dower
104. WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 253-61 (discussing limitations on talaq' in Jordanian
law and the requirement of registering out-of-court talaq'); JLPS, Article 91 ("If a
man divorces his wife before the qadi, voluntarily and of his own choice, while in a
state considered shar'i, or acknowledges a talaq [that occurred] when he was in such a
state, no claim made by him against this shall be heard."), quoted in WELCHMAN, su-
pra note 5, at 253; JLPS, Article 94 (stating that under normal circumstances every
talaq is revocable except the third), quoted in WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 255; JLPS,
Article 85 (stating that each of the three talaqs must take place on separate occasions),
quoted in WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 256.
105. See WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 262 n.49 (citing JLPS, Article 101).
106. See id. at 260 (citing JLPS, Article 101). Failure to register extra-judicial talaq pre-
vents the husband from raising court claims based thereon; for example, he may not
use an unregistered talaq as a defense against his wife's suit for maintenance. How-
ever, a wife may go to court to prove the existence of an unregistered talaq if she
wishes to use it to exit the marriage. See id. at 260-61.
107. See WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 143 ("The standard explanation for the registration
of a high deferred dower is to deter the husband from unilaterally divorcing his wife
in view of the costs he would thereby incur.").
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immediately upon divorce.108 According to the theory of rational choice,
a person will only divorce if the benefits of doing so exceed the costs;'09
therefore, since increasing the deferred dower increases the costs of
divorce, it decreases the likelihood that the husband will find it to be in
his interests to divorce his wife.
"In this rational choice model, we would expect government poli-
cies that affect the costs associated with divorcing to affect the divorce
rate." " 0 However, the evidence in both the Palestinian Authority and in
the United States does not support this theory. In the United States,
several economists studied the effects on the divorce rate of changing
from a fault-divorce system to a unilateral no-fault system. Under the
fault system, a married couple could divorce only if one of a limited
number of conditions existed in the marriage; therefore, if a spouse
wished to divorce for reasons other than those enumerated in the law,
he had to pay the other spouse to say that one of the legal conditions for
divorce existed. Under the no-fault system, however, no such payment
was needed, and according to the theory of rational choice, this reduc-
tion in the cost of divorce should have resulted in a higher divorce rate.
Instead, researchers found that the choice of a unilateral no-fault law
over a fault law had no effect on divorce rates in the United States.''
Similarly, researchers in Palestine have not found a correlation be-
tween the number of talaqs and the amount of deferred dower." 2 If
practical levels of deferred dower have no effect on rates of talaq, it is
unlikely that formal limits on mahr would have any effect either. Moors
does reveal, however, that at least in Mandatory times the prospect of
108. JLPS, Article 46 (stating that unless an alternative date is specified, deferred dower
will be due upon talaq or death of one of the spouses), quoted in WELCHMAN, supra
note 5, at 200.
109. See JACOBSEN, supra note 94. Neither the benefits nor the costs need to be financial or
even tangible; the theory of economic choice as applied to divorce envisions a subjec-
tive evaluation, in which the individual balances the emotional benefits of being free
of an unhappy marriage against the financial costs of divorce as well as the difficulties
of leaving one's own home and living on one's own.
110. Id. at96.
111. See id. at 97-98 (reviewing the conclusions of several researchers and demonstrating
that the main economist who found differences in divorce rates between fault and no-
fault states did not control for regional differences in the perceived benefit of di-
vorce).
112. See WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 143-44 (reviewing the work of Shalabi, who exam-
ined the relationship between dower and talaqs in Ramallah); MooRs, supra note 1,
at 139 ("It is hard to say whether the deferred dower is a major deterrent to arbitrary
repudiation, but it is evident that the reverse is not true, at least not in the villages.
During the British mandate, registering a deferred dowry was not common in the ru-
ral areas, but few women were repudiated.").
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raising a new prompt dower for remarriage deterred men from divorcing
their current wives; in this way, at least, dower may protect women from
talaq. 13
Further comparison of the effects of unilateral no-fault divorce in
the United States and of eliminating dower in Palestine, however, re-
veals that eliminating mahr harms women by reducing their financial
security following talaq. While the institution of unilateral no-fault di-
vorce did not raise the divorce rate in the United States, it did
significantly decrease the settlement amounts that women received from/" 114
the divorce. Economist Joyce Jacobsen explains this as being consis-
tent with the Coase Theorem, which states: "if transaction costs are
negligible, a change in property rights does not change resource alloca-
tion but does influence the distribution of wealth.""..5 No-fault divorce
reassigned the property right of divorce from it being a mutual decision
to a unilateral decision, and thus eliminated the requirement that the
divorcing party offer his spouse a financial incentive in exchange for
agreement to the divorce. Similarly, talaq under Palestinian law has neg-
ligible transaction costs, since extra-judicial talaq is legal and need only
be registered with the court." 6 Therefore, a change in the law regarding
the wife's right to dower will affect the distribution of wealth from her
husband to her upon divorce. This theory of the effect of eliminating
mahr is supported by Moors' observation that women in Nablus "gener-
ally do not regard a high deferred dower as a major disincentive to talaq
.... Rather they consider the deferred dower as financial security for
the divorced woman."" 7 Given the restrictions on women's work de-
scribed in Section III, deferred dower is often the only thing standing
between poor divorced women and severe economic hardship.
2. Mahr and Khul'
In addition to impoverishing women who are divorced against their
will, eliminating mahr makes it more difficult for a woman to obtain a
divorce against the will of her husband. It does so by reducing a wife's
leverage in bargaining for khul', the only way in which a woman may
initiate no-fault divorce under Islamic law. Khul' in Palestinian law is a
113. MOORS, supra note 1, at 139.
114. See JACOBSEN, supra note 94, at 97.
115. Id.
116. WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 258-59.
117. MOORS, supra note 1, at 139.
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private agreement between spouses in which the husband grants his wife
a divorce in exchange for her agreement to forego her traditional
financial rights upon the dissolution of the marriage: namely, the
deferred dower and maintenance during the idda' period."8 Therefore,
the wife must obtain her husband's agreement in order to obtain a khul'
divorce-much as was the case in the United States before unilateral no-
fault divorce was instituted, the Palestinian wife must "pay" her
husband to divorce her."9 According to Welchman, most divorces in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip are khul'divorces, in which women renounce
their right to deferred dower and maintenance. 20 Eliminating the
deferred dower would take away one of the wife's only bargaining chips
in negotiations for khul', and it is likely that husbands would be less
likely to consider granting their wives a divorce to be in their interests.
This is significant not only for women who are merely unhappy with
their marriages, but also for those women who suffer from spousal
abuse; although abuse is grounds for judicial divorce under Palestinian
law, the burden of proof upon the abused spouse is very high, and
judges are generally disposed to attempt a reconciliation."' Many abused
women therefore seek to escape their marriages through khul' rather
than through the courts. 122 Eliminating dower would substantially
reduce their ability to do so, and as a result would trap a number of
women in unhappy or abusive relationships.
CONCLUSION
After reviewing the interaction between mahr and the other per-
sonal status laws and placing that interaction in its proper economic and
cultural backdrop, it becomes clear that eliminating the dower would
materially harm the majority of Palestinian women. If Palestinian
118. See RUBENBERG, supra note 68, at 101-02 (discussing ways in which Palestinian
women may seek divorce).
119. See id.; JACOBSEN, supra note 94, at 98. The difference between the Palestinian rules
regarding divorce and the pre-no-fault United States divorce laws lies in the fact that
Palestinian men have no-fault divorce. Therefore, instead of the rule resulting in
higher payments to women in order to allow men to divorce, it merely results in
women redistributing their own wealth in order to obtain the desired legal result.
120. WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 144 ("Such a settlement may involve the woman receiv-
ing a certain sum from her divorcer, but her waiving of her legal right means firstly
that she cannot hold him to that commitment, and secondly that certainly she does
not receive the whole registered sum.").
121. See WCLAC Report, supra note 21; see also WELCHMAN, supra note 5, at 235.
122. See MOORS, supra note 1, 142-46.
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women's organizations genuinely wish to improve the lives of Palestin-
ian women, they must agitate for reforms that benefit the lower classes
in which most Palestinian women live. Although the modernizing elite
may well see benefit in the adoption of token dower, responsible femi-
nists should seek to prevent the spread of this custom to the lower class,
and should encourage women to take full advantage of their financial
rights in dower. t

